Why FMEA Programmes Fail to Deliver Value
The analysis exists.
The connection does not.
FMEA is mandatory on many capital projects, required by several industry standards, and commonly produced as a deliverable from engineering consultants and equipment vendors. Despite this, the majority of operational FMEA documents in asset-intensive industries are not connected to the maintenance programme, not reviewed after initial completion, and not used to make maintenance or inspection decisions.
The reasons are structural. Most FMEA documents are produced to satisfy a project gate or compliance requirement — they are completed as a document delivery, not as a living engineering tool. The engineers who produced them move to the next project. The operations team receive the document at handover. It lives in a document management system where it is never opened again.
The value of FMEA is not in producing the document. It is in the decisions the document drives. Which failure modes justify condition-based monitoring? Which justify time-based replacement? Which can be run to failure without consequence? Which require a spare part to be held as insurance? Which require a change to the inspection programme? Without a structured process for converting FMECA outputs into maintenance and inspection decisions, the analysis is academic.
01
FMEA produced at project stage, never updatedThe system design changes during commissioning. The operating context differs from the design assumption. Failure modes discovered in early operation are not fed back into the FMEA. Within months of handover, the document no longer accurately represents the asset as operated.
02
No connection between FMEA outputs and maintenance plansThe FMEA identifies that a pump seal has a high-consequence failure mode with a detectable degradation signature, but the maintenance plan continues to schedule time-based replacement at the same interval as when the asset was new. The FMEA and the maintenance plan were never connected.
03
RPN scores used as the only prioritisation mechanismRisk Priority Numbers are a product of three ordinal scales — severity, occurrence and detection. Multiplying ordinal numbers produces a meaningless result. A high RPN failure mode on a non-critical asset may warrant less attention than a low RPN failure mode on a safety-critical asset. RPN without consequence context is not a reliable prioritisation tool.
04
Failure modes recorded without function definitionA failure mode is only meaningful in the context of the function it defeats. Without a clear functional description — what the asset is required to do and to what standard — failure mode statements become generic equipment fault lists that do not distinguish between failure modes with different maintenance implications.
05
No action owner or completion mechanismEven where FMEA workshops identify recommended actions — changes to maintenance tasks, new inspection points, spare parts to stock, design modifications — the action register has no owner, no timeline and no follow-up mechanism. The recommended actions are recorded and not implemented.